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RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
The Utah Securities Division and the Department of Business 
Regulation, respondents herein, by and through Mark J. Griffin, 
Assistant Attorney General, file this Response and Brief in 
Partial Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari pursuant to 
Rule 47, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Appellant presents three issues for review: First, was the 
appellant transaction a sale of securities within the meaning of 
§61-1-13(15)(a); second, were the purported gifts of stock in 
"good faith"; and third, was the Utah Securities Advisory Board 
acting within its statutory authority when it entered an order 
pursuant to §61-1-14(3) suspending the use of all secondary 
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trading exemptions for the securities of Amenity, Inc., its 
affiliates and successors. 
The Respondents, with the clarifications as follow herein, 
do not oppose the petition on the first issue. However, the 
Respondents do oppose the granting of the Writ on the second and 
third issues, for the reasons set out hereinafter. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Review is sought of a July 3, 1989 decision rendered by the 
Utah Court of Appeals. The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction 
to review this matter by a Writ of Certiorari pursuant to §78-2-
2(5), Utah Code Annotated, (1953 as amended). 
CONTROLLING STATUTES 
The Appellant has cited the following sections as being 
controlling this matter: §§61-1-7, 61-1-13(15), 61-1-14(3), and 
61-1-20, Utah Code Ann., (1953 as amended). In addition to the 
sections of the statute as above-cited, the Respondents believe 
that §61-1-24(1) and §61-1-14.5, Utah Code Ann., (1953 as 
amended) are also controlling in this matter: 
The Division may from time to time make, 
amended and rescind such rules, forms and 
orders as are necessary to carry out the 
provisions of this chapter... 
U.C.A. §61-1-24 (1) 
In any proceeding under this chapter, civil, 
criminal, administrative or judicial, the 
burden of providing an exemption under §61-1-
14 or an exception from a definition under 
§61-1-13 is upon the person claiming the 
exemption or exception. 
U.C.A. §61-1-14.5 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Appellant has requested the Writ of Certiorari for the 
purpose of reviewing the final decision of the Utah Court of 
Appeals issued July 3, 1989, upholding the order of the Third 
Judicial District Court, in upholding the final order of the 
Utah Securities Division suspending the use of all secondary 
trading exemptions available to the securities of Amenity, Inc., 
its affiliates and successors, entered February 18, 1987. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
On June 5, 1989, the Utah Securities Division brought an 
Administrative action pursuant to §61-1-14(3) of the Utah Uniform 
Securities Act (the "Act"), alleging that a distribution of stock 
in Amenity, Inc., was in violation of §61-1-7 of the Act. The 
petition sought the suspension of all possible exemptions for 
further trading of Amenity stock without registration. The 
Administrative Law Judge issued his Finding of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Recommended Order on October 28, 1986. On January 8, 
1987, the Division issued an order adopting limited provisions of 
the Administrative Law Judge's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law but specifically rejected the Judge's determination of 
whether the distribution was in fact sale of securities, and 
whether the distribution of Amenity stock constituted a "good 
faith" gift. The January 8th order of the Division called for an 
evidentiary hearing to be held on January 20, 1987, for the 
purpose of determining whether the distribution of Amenity stock 
was an effort to frustrate or circumvent the registration 
provisions of the Act. 
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Following the hearing held on January 20, 1987, the Division 
issued an order on February 18, 1987 suspending the use of all 
secondary trading exemptions for the securities of Amenity, Inc., 
its affiliates and successors. 
On April 16, 1987, Appellant appealed the Division's order 
to the Third Judicial District Court. After reviewing the briefs 
on file, examining the record of the administrative proceedings, 
and after conducting a hearing on September 17, 1987, the 
District Court issued its order upholding the Final Order of the 
Division. 
Appellant thereafter appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals, 
and, following review of briefs submitted and hearing, the Utah 
Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the Third District Court 
on July 3, 1989. Appellant now applies for a Writ of Certiorari 
to the Utah Court of Appeals for its decision of July 3, 1989. 
C. Statement of the Facts 
1. Amenity was incorporated in the State of Utah on 
January 7, 1986. On January 8, 1986, one million shares of 
Amenity stock were issued to Appellant in exchange for $2,000.00 
cash. At least two of the officers and directors of the 
Appellant were incorporators and directors of Amenity. The 
$2,000.00 which Amenity received from the Appellant was the only 
asset of Amenity at the time of the filing of the Division's 
administrative petition. 
2. After receiving the one million shares of Amenity 
stock, Appellant distributed to approximately 900 different 
individuals and organizations one hundred shares of stock each. 
3. Appellant filed no registration with Utah Securities 
Division for the distribution of the shares issued to the 900 
individuals and entities, 
4. According to Appellant, the purpose of the distribution 
to the 900 individuals was to reward them for past association, 
loyalty, and to enhance the general exposure of the Appellant's 
financial consulting business to persons in the financial world, 
thus creating general and specific good will. 
5. Appellant engaged in a major campaign of incorporating 
over 30 other companies by the same means and distributing the 
shares, again to a wide range of individuals and entities, in a 
fashion similar to the distribution which took place with regard 
to Amenity stock. 
6. In the summer of 1986, Amenity, Inc. was acquired by 
Elkin Weiss Companies, Inc. Appellant was instrumental in the 
acquisition of Amenity and received $25,000.00 from Elkin Weiss 
for its role in the acquisition and for its Amenity Stock. 
7. At the time of the Division's administrative hearing in 
January, Elkin Weiss' unrestricted stock was trading at 
approximately $3.00 a share in the open market. The Division 
thus found that the purpose of the distribution of Amenity stock 
was to circumvent or evade the Act and the registration 




A WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED TO DETERMINE WHETHER 
THE FINDING OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS IS IN CONFLICT 
WITH A PRIOR DECISION OF THIS COURT, ANDREWS V, CHASE, 
89 Utah 51, 49 P.2d 938 (1935). 
In its petition appellant relies heavily upon the holding of 
Andrews V, Chase, 89 Utah 51, 49 P.2d 838 (1935). The reliance 
by the appellant on the Andrews case is misplaced. Andrews was 
decided in 1935 under a statute which in some significant points 
is different from the current Utah Uniform Securities Act. A 
plain reading of the Utah Uniform Securities Act and amendments 
thereto would indicate that it was the legislative intent that 
the Andrews opinion be legislatively overruled. In Andrews, 
there purported to be a gift of assessable stock. The Andrews 
opinion held that the purported gift was not a "sale" within the 
meaning of the Securities Act. 
In its enactment of the Utah Uniform Securities Act in 1963, 
the legislature, in the definitional section of the Act, provided 
that "a purported gift of assessable stock is considered to 
involve an offer or sale." U.C.A. §61-1-13(10)(d) (1965 Supp.) 
In 1983, the legislature went further in strengthening the 
language of this particular section. "A purported gift of 
assessable stock ijs an offer or sale, as is each assessment 
levied on the stock." U.C.A. §61-1-13(14)(c)(ii) (1983 Supp.) 
(emphasis added.) The conclusion can be drawn from the language 
of these two amendments that the legislature specifically 
intended that purported gifts of assessable stock be offers or 
sales of securities within the meaning of §7 of the Utah Uniform 
Act, Additionally, the conclusion may be drawn that the 
legislature also considers that some other forms of "purported 
gifts of stock" could be interpreted as sales of securities 
within the meaning of §7 of the Act. 
This conclusion is strengthened by the existence of a 1983 
amendment to §61-1-13 which excluded from the definition of sale 
a "good faith gift." Utah Code Ann., §61-1-13(14)(d)(i) (1983 
Supp.) provides "the terms defined in subsection (a) and (b) do 
not include (i) a good faith gift." It stands to reason, that 
when the legislature intended to exclude from the definition of 
offer of sale "good faith" gifts, it contemplated categories of 
gifts that would not satisfy the "good faith" requirement and 
could be considered "offers or sales" within the meaning of §7 of 
the Act. 
In light of these recent amendments to Utah Uniform 
Securities Act, the Respondent urges the Court to take up the 
narrow question of whether Andrews ought to be specifically 
overruled. 
If the Court were to take the position that there remains a 
portion of the Andrews opinion which was not legislatively 
overruled by subsequent amendments, then Respondents would argue 
that the facts of this case are distinct from those presented to 
the Court in Andrews, and, therefore, Andrews is not applicable 
to the instant action. Andrews presented a situation which 
involved a purported gift of assessable stock. In the instant 
action, the purported gifts were, in actuality, a distribution of 
stock intended to formulate a public company for the purpose of 
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creating a merger vehicle whereby a private company may go public 
without the necessity of registration, clearly in circumvention 
of the registration provisions of the Act. Respondent will argue 
that the facts presented by this case confront the Court with 
issues which are strikingly different from those presented to it 
in the Andrews case. 
POINT TWO 
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED FOR 
THE PURPOSE OF REVIEWING THE DECISION OF THE 
COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMING THE DETERMINATION OF THE 
SECURITIES DIVISION THAT THE PURPORTED GIFTS 
WERE NOT MADE IN GOOD FAITH. 
The Writ of Certiorari should not be granted to review the 
determination of the Respondent that the distribution of Amenity 
stock was not a "good faith gift" because the determination was 
both reasonable and rational and the Appellant in its Petition 
has alleged no fact or law to the contrary. 
The scope of review of the Division's Administrative 
decision is limited to a determination of whether the decision is 
reasonable, rational and is not arbitrary or capricious. Silver 
Beehive Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission/ 30 Utah 2d. 
44, 512 P.2d 1327 (1973); Williams v. Public Service Commission, 
29 Utah 2d 9, 504 P.2d 34, 36 (1972). 
Additionally, the Utah Uniform Securities Act provides that 
the burden of proving an exemption under §61-1-14 or an exception 
for a definition under §61-1-13 is upon the person claiming the 
exemption or exception, Utah Code Ann. §61-1-14.5. 
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Appellant wishes to take appeal on the point because, as 
stated in the petition, Appellant perceives that "there is not a 
scintilla of evidence in the record of any bad faith . • .
 f
 w 
Appellant's Petition, at 11, and because the record has "ample 
evidence of good faith." Appellant's Petition, at 11. 
To establish its good faith, Appellant points to three 
factors: 
1. Intent to benefit the donees; 
2. Steps taken to develop the company; and 
3. Lack of intent to violate Section 7 of the Act. 
Yet none of the three factors addresses the basis for the 
Division's determination that the Appellants failed to 
demonstrate "good faith". The Court below noted: 
"The Board determined CGC failed to meet this 
burden [of proving the good faith exception] and 
consequently held the disposition was not a "good 
faith gift". This conclusion was largely based upon 
the Board's finding that through the disposition CGC 
intended to circumvent the Act's registration 
requirement. The conclusion finds further support in 
the fact that CGC's veiled but fairly obvious purpose 
was to advance its own economic objections rather than 
make a gift for reasons of simple generosity. 
Capital General Corporation v. Utah 
Department of Business Regulation 112 Utah Adv. Rep. 
31, 33 (CA 7/3.89) 
In short, Appellant wishes this Court to overturn the 
decision of the lower Courts and the Division because Appellant 
feels it can demonstrate some quantum of good faith. Appellant 
does not challenge in its petition the fundamental basis for 
these decisions: that the principal aim and scheme of the 
distribution was to circumvent the registration provisions of the 
Act and enrich its own coffers in the process. 
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Since appellant does not challenge the main basis for the 
findings below, that Respondents' order was both reasonable and 
rational, Respondents respectfully request that the Court refuse 
to take up the second question presented for review. 
POINT III 
THE UTAH SECURITIES DIVISION HAD STATUTORY 
AUTHORITY FOR THE ISSUANCE OF ITS ORDER SUSPENDING 
EXEMPTION, AND, THEREFORE, THIS COURT SHOULD NOT GRANT 
THE PETITION WITH RESPECT TO THIS ISSUE. 
The Appellant, in presentation of its third proposed question for 
review, takes unwarranted encouragement from certain language in 
the opinion of the Court of Appeals. That opinion noted that, 
"even if Capital General Corporation is technically correct in 
its assertion [that the Division was not statutorily authorized 
to order the challenged suspensions under §61-1-14(3)], we would 
hold the error harmless." Id at 33. 
The Court of Appeals did not say the Division lacked 
authority under §14 of the Act to order the suspensions, as 
Appellant's petition implies, rather the Court merely pointed out 
that if the Division so chose, the same result might have been 
achieved under §20 of the Act; therefore, any error in this 
regard would be harmless. 
Appellant's Petition does not argue that the Division lacked 
authority under §14 to order the suspensions but instead 
elaborates upon the differences that Appellant perceives between 
the available procedural and substantiative remedies under §14(3) 
and §20 of the Act. But the first question to be decided is the 
existence of authority under §14(3). 
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In this regard, the question presented by Appellants to the 
lower Court was characterized by that Court as follows: 
"CGC final contention is that §61-1-14(3) which 
authorizes the Board to deny or suspend certain secondary trading 
exemptions, does not authorize the order of suspension challenged 
here, CGC argues that since it is not claiming any secondary 
exemption, there is no basis for the suspension and the Board 
erred in issuing the ordering reliance on §61-1-14(3)." jld at 
33. 
Section 14(3) of the Act provides that the Division 
may by order deny or revoke any exemption 
specified in Subsection [14](l)(h), [14](l)(j) or 
[14] (2) with respect to (a) a specific security, 
transaction, or series of transactions; or (b) any 
person or issuer, any affiliate or successor to a 
person or issuer, or any entity subsequently 
organized by or on behalf of a person or issuer 
generally. Utah Code Ann. §61-1-14(3). 
Appellant contends in its petition that it is "obvious" that 
§14(3) is designed to allow correction of situations where 
exemptions are being claimed which should not be. In the Court 
below, Appellant made this assertion its main point of attack on 
the Division's authority. But this Court can plainly see that 
there is nothing on the face of §14(3) which requires that an 
exemption be affirmatively claimed before the Division may revoke 
it. For example, numerous exemptions provided for in §14(2) are 
self-executing and require no affirmative filing or formal claim, 
yet §14(3) clearly contemplates the Division's authority to 
revoke any of the 14(2) secondary trading exemptions. 
The Court below noted the existence of similar authority to 
achieve similar results found elsewhere in the Act under §20. 
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Yet another source for this authority, opinion is found in §24 of 
the Act: "The Division may from time to time make, amend, and 
rescind such rules, forms, and orders as are necessary to carry 
out the provisions of this chapter . • . ." Utah Code Ann. §61-1-
24. 
This general enabling power embraces the type of order which 
is the subject matter of this appeal. There are, therefore, 
three sections of the Act which provide ample authority for the 
Division's order suspending all secondary trading exemption. 
In conclusion, in accordance with Rule 47, Respondents urge 
the Court to grant Appellant's petition, in part, for the sole 
purpose of determining if the order of the Division is consistent 
with previous rulings of this Court. 
DATED t h i s / -> ~— day of UU\U*f / 1 9 8 9 . 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
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